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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 June 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (OIRA)  
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Colonel Dale M. Garvey, USA (JIG)

SUBJECT : NIE 100-5-58: IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING  
CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WARFARE FOR THE  
COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on 12 June.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on 2 September.

*William P. Bundy*  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

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   GROWING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WARFARE FOR THE  
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THE PROBLEM

To estimate the effects of increasing capabilities for nuclear warfare on public attitudes and behavior, and on national policies in the Communist Bloc and the Free World.

SCOPE NOTE

1. The development of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems confronts governments and peoples throughout much of the world with the unprecedented possibility of the rapid and near total destruction of life and material wealth. The nature and imminence of the threat has been further highlighted during the past year by the much publicized Soviet achievements in the field of missiles, by the US missile testing program, and by the continuing debate over disarmament and strategy in the nuclear age.

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2. The purpose of this paper is not to identify and examine all the implications of the nuclear situation. Rather, we shall confine ourselves to (a) the effect of the nuclear situation on popular attitudes with respect to key political issues of the present and future; and (b) the effects of the nuclear situation and potential developments in advanced nuclear weapons systems on government policies in matters of vital concern to the US.

3. We recognize that with the exception of certain specific problems, such as the allocation of defense budgets, it is difficult to demonstrate clearly the direct effect of nuclear weapons developments. Many of the effects can only be inferred; much of the discussion of possible future behavior and response becomes highly speculative. Nevertheless, it should be possible to assess major current trends in popular thinking and to analyze the nature and implications of official reactions and programs.

4. As in NIE 100-4-57, attention should be focused primarily on the USSR, Communist China, Japan, India, Canada, and Western Europe. However, the nuclear situation has serious implications for other countries vulnerable to direct Soviet pressures, and the nuclear stalemate may play an important role in the calculations of certain neutralists like Nasser. Implications for the positions and policies of these lesser powers should be treated in general terms.

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5. We shall not attempt to review in detail material covered in other current estimates, particularly SNIE 11-6-58: "Soviet Position on Disarmament," NIE 100-4-58: "Probable Sino-Soviet Reactions to US Deployment of IRBMs on the Bloc Periphery," and NIE 100-2-58: "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries." Wherever possible the contributions should take the form of an updating of NIE 100-4-57.

## QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM\*

I. Trends in Opinion with Respect to the Implications of the Nuclear Weapons Situation

A. Based on major developments in the field of nuclear weapons and delivery systems over the past year, and the nature and extent of publicity and propaganda concerning the nuclear situation, and on any other observable data, what opinions are prevalent within "informed" circles and the people at large of the selected countries and areas respecting:

1. Likelihood of general war, dangers of war by error

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Wherever appropriate, the questions should be construed as referring to both the free world and the Bloc.

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à la Khrushchev's charges to the UN; likelihood of local conflicts and the chances of containing such conflicts; consequences for the individual country and the world at large of a general or local war involving the use of nuclear weapons.

2. Probability of, and justification for the use of nuclear weapons in local and general conflicts. Does the public at large differentiate between "clean" and "dirty" weapons and to what extent does this affect their attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons?

3. Means of lessening the chances of general war or the involvement in war including:

(a) Alliance and alignment versus neutralism or non-alignment;

(b) The strategy and terms of deterrence in general, including its implications for containing and preventing limited war;

(c) Advantages and disadvantages of permitting US bases on their territory;

(d) National possession and/or independent production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems;

(e) The need for and prospects of a general limitation of armaments; the general extent and nature of inspection

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and control necessary to insure compliance (to what extent is the US position understood and accepted?);

(f) Disengagement schemes and "nuclear free" zones.

4. The testing of nuclear weapons -- biologic effects, the need or justification of continued testing, significance or importance of a cessation of testing and types of controls necessary to insure compliance with a test ban. Have pressures for a test ban increased or decreased over the past year?

5. Degrees of risk acceptable in defense of national interests.

6. Is there any evidence of a consistent relationship between individual views on nuclear weapons and other factors such as the individual's political, educational, and religious background and the historical experience of his country and its geographical location.

B. What trends are likely in attitudes toward the nuclear weapons situation? How will these attitudes be affected by popular conceptions of the relative delivery capabilities of the US and USSR?

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**III. Effects of the Nuclear Weapons Situation on National Policies**

A. What important changes or modifications in national policies have been evident to date and what trends are likely as a result directly or indirectly of the nuclear situation?

1. The strategy of deterrence.

(a) To what extent is this strategy considered effective in the free world in terms of preventing general and limited war and in keeping limited war limited? How is their view of its effectiveness affected by their estimate of trends in the relative nuclear capabilities of the US and the USSR?

(b) Estimates of the willingness of major powers to risk war in defense of vital interests; willingness to incite, counter, or support local wars?

(c) Assessment of likelihood of use of nuclear weapons in general or local wars and implications of such use for keeping limited wars limited.

(d) What views exist in free world official circles with respect to their own military requirements?

(e) How are these views being reflected in current and projected military organization, doctrine, force

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levels, military expenditures, deployments, etc.?

(f) Acquisition of nuclear capabilities from allies, or by individual effort, through joint efforts? or from allies?

3. Cohesiveness of alliances, the spread of neutralism, and isolationism?

4. Extent of official pressures for high level negotiations between the West and the Bloc?

5. Other aspects of foreign policy including economic policy, cultural exchanges, relations with the underdeveloped and former colonial areas.

B. What special problems or opportunities does the general nuclear situation appear to offer to the smaller and more isolated countries on the fringes of Eurasia? How do the leaders of Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, and Turkey view the implications of growing Soviet nuclear power? How does the nuclear stalemate affect the calculations of neutralist leaders, including Nasser who may be disposed to aggressive foreign policies?

III. What will be the Probable Effects of the Conditions and Trends Described in I and II on:



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1. The future susceptibility of non-Communist powers to Soviet nuclear threats. Of Communist powers to Western nuclear threats?

2. The probable reaction of the peoples and governments of the selected countries or areas in the event nuclear war between the US and the USSR should appear imminent in the near future; over the longer run?

3. The probable reaction of the peoples and governments of the selected countries in the event nuclear war between the US and the USSR appeared imminent in the near future; over the longer run? Consider the effects if the imminence of war resulted from a US counter to an aggressive Soviet move, from a Soviet reaction to strong US moves against vital Soviet interests or developed from a situation in which interests and responsibilities were not clearly evident to the world at large. Consider the reactions if these nations were offered neutrality or were threatened with destruction as an alternative to capitulation.